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the maritime unions have made on this issue.

There being no objection, the text was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

We must advise you of our concern over indications that profiteering interests may succeed in excluding American-flag ships from carrying wheat sold to Soviet Union. Claims are being made and apparently listened to by administration officials first that American flag ships are not available and second that they are not available at what these profiteering interests call a fair price. Both claims are false.

There are many American flag vessels suitable for carrying grain now in temporary inactive status. This does not include vessels in government boneyards. Success of this attack on American flag participation in wheat deal will mean more ships in our boneyards and more unemployment and hardship among American seamen.

On the matter of costs no one yet has approached any sea union to discuss special problems for which special arrangements might be worked out. American runaway flag operators and other foreign flag ship-owners want to take over transport of this wheat for their own profit. Communists would like to see them take over. They do not want American-flag vessels and American crews bringing this cargo into their ports because that would make Soviet people realize that our great democracy working under a free system is the only one that can supply them with this food.

If the principles on use of American flag ships which you set in approving this sale to the Soviets are scuttled the National Maritime Union will be forced to picket in protest and will call on our brothers in other unions to support our protest against those who would exploit this wheat deal for their own profit sacrificing American ships and seamen and aiding the Communist cause.

OBSERVANCE OF AMERICAN ART WEEK

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I wish to call our attention to the fact that American Art Week is being celebrated during these days between November 1 and November 7.

Observance of American Art Week is of particular significance to me as chairman of the Senate Special Subcommittee on the Arts, which has just concluded 5 days of hearings on the two bills we have before the Senate to develop and enhance our Nation's cultural resources, S. 1318 sponsored by Senator HUMPHREY and S. 165 sponsored by Senator JAVITS. I am privileged to be a cosponsor of these two bills. I believe them to be the most comprehensive and constructive legislation in the arts area, which we have ever had an opportunity to consider in the Senate.

Testimony presented at the subcommittee hearings clearly demonstrates that the arts in the United States are in a ferment of growth, potentially healthy and capable of producing a true renaissance of artistic achievement, but that they are also in a state of crisis because of inadequate support.

I will have much more to say on this subject at a later date; but today I would like to leave the thought with you that throughout the hearings witnesses emphasized the urgent need for cooperation and partnership as we strive toward our goals—a coordinated, dynamic approach

to artistic encouragement from individual, civic, foundation, corporate, and government sources. The Federal Government, it was stressed repeatedly, has a vital role to play in this area.

At the hearings—through the testimony of nearly 40 distinguished witnesses—I was impressed once again by the immense variety of our artistic and cultural life. It is the very essence of our democracy and its supreme expression. I think we would do well to bear this in mind during American Art Week, which began by fortuitous coincidence on the final day of the subcommittee hearings.

A CALL TO ACTION

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I have been impressed with the lead article in the November 1963 issue of *Guidposts*, an inspirational monthly magazine for men and women of all faiths which is edited by Dr. and Mrs. Norman Vincent Peale. The article is entitled "Is There a Conspiracy Against God: A Call to Action." It was written by Dr. Bella V. Dodd, formerly a professor at Hunter College and now a practicing attorney in New York City. Mrs. Dodd is known all over America as a former Communist, who having seen the error of her ways in an earlier time has dedicated her life to exposing Communist fallacies and Communist tactics for all the world to see and better understand. She has just written a book entitled "School of Darkness: A Personal Record of Communism, U.S.A." which has been published by the Devin-Adair Co.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that this eloquent and effective article be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of these remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A CALL TO ACTION
(By Bella V. Dodd)

The day the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the use of the regents' prayer in New York schools was unconstitutional, I was in a New York court on other matters. News of the decision passed through the room in excited whispers. Sitting next to me was a young lawyer, obviously fresh out of law school.

"Good," he muttered. Then he pointed to the words on a plaque over the judge's bench—In God We Trust—and he added: "That's the next thing that has to go."

I was stunned. "Young man," I said, "I'm old enough to be your grandmother, and you can take my word for it: when that sign comes down your career will be over because there will be no real law for you to practice."

This, I believe, is the heart of the matter. This is the great danger which faces America if we pursue our present course of removing the acknowledgment of God from our daily lives. Without God, I am convinced, we will have no law and order, no morality, no conscience.

Since that day the momentum of our drive in this direction has rapidly increased. Here are examples:

A Maryland atheist who says "My child shall not pray" has brought about a Supreme Court decision that your child and mine shall not pray in school either. This same person has since started a school for atheism in Kansas which is to include a university, radio station, and printing plant.

A Pennsylvanian who opposes Bible reading in classrooms has been able to have this Bible exercise eliminated from every classroom in the country.

A court case is pending in California to remove the words "under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance.

Under attack are the motto "In God We Trust" on our coins, the use of chaplains in the armed services, and prayers before Government and public gatherings. The objective: to make America officially a godless nation.

It is disheartening to see the submissiveness of school authorities, teachers, and public officials who are going even beyond the Supreme Court edict in removing all reference to the Deity. The New York State Education Commissioner, for example, declared that the recitation of the fourth stanza of "America"—which refers to God—cannot be used as a part of the opening school exercise.

In Sacramento County, Calif., it was ruled unconstitutional for schoolchildren to say this grace with their milk and cookies: "God is great. God is good. Let us thank Him for our food."

Behind the scenes are forces at work whose purpose is to remove God as an important influence in the life of our Nation. Billy Graham was right when in his recent Los Angeles crusade he said, "the effort to remove God and moral teachings from our schools is a diabolical scheme."

For several years, I was a member of this anti-God crusade myself. Like many misguided idealists, I went through a period when I put the brotherhood of man above the fatherhood of God, and, as so often happens, this led me into the Communist Party. As early as 1936, I was a disciplined Communist; between 1944 and 1949, I was in the top echelon of the Communist Party of the United States.

I thought I was fighting for social justice, but eventually I discovered that the party did not even have a file on various social reforms. The Communist Party exists not to improve conditions in America but to control them, and not to control them for the benefit of the people but the benefit of the party. It was this realization that finally drove me from communism and, after years of seeking, back to God.

Even in those days there was a well-organized campaign to eliminate God from our education. I was active in this area; I had been a college professor and an organizer of teachers' unions. I knew from experience that students look to their teachers for personal guidance more often than to their parents, and for this reason I labored to recruit as many teachers to communism as I could.

These days, as then, it is not the Communist Party alone which seeks to remove from schools all incidents of a religious nature, whether prayer, Bible reading, or the reference to God in the pledge of allegiance. But whatever they call themselves these groups have the same goal: the displacement of the law of God by the law of man.

It is not surprising that those against God should aim their biggest weapons at our schools. Our school years are our most impressionable. Eliminating the concept of God from education leaves the student with no basis for determining right from wrong.

Therefore, I feel that the argument presented by some political and religious leaders that the Court's decisions put religion back where it belongs—in the church and the home—is unrealistic. American youngsters between 7 and 21 spend more waking hours at school and school activities than they do at home and church combined. They need more—not less—emphasis on spiritual values in school.

The instigators of the school controversy, moreover, have not fought their cause on the basis of religion but rather on the basis of

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Constitutional rights. They have won in the precise area where they should have lost.

With 4,000 years of recorded history, the American Constitution is the only document of government to be based on the law of God as defined in natural law, the decalog, and divine revelation. Its authors were believers; their faith is evident in the guarantees for individual freedom which they wrote into the Constitution. Furthermore, by their checks and balances on the three government branches (executive, legislative, judicial), they assured that no branch should overpower the others and that, while protecting the rights of minorities, government should remain in the hands of the majority of the people. This is the freedom of religion which the authors of the Constitution had in mind.

Constitutionally, no American can be forced to act against his conscience. In war, we respect the rights of conscientious objectors who refuse to bear arms. This same principle applies to activities in schools.

If parents, acting in conscience, decide they don't want their child to participate in religious observances, the Pledge to the Flag or, say, competitive athletics, they have the right to ask for him to be excused. The question is—do these minorities have the right to impose their judgment on all the other children?

The answer is an obvious no. Yet this has happened. Every parent, indeed every citizen, should ask: "What can we do about it?"

As a start, parents must reclaim control of their school boards, making their wants known and heeded, assuring that government in our country remains from the grass roots up instead of being imposed from the top down. By failing to speak out, parents are allowing a small vocal minority to establish the educational philosophy under which their children shall be trained.

Furthermore, Americans who wish to retain our God-centered civilization must themselves become more vocal in all areas of this controversy.

Members of Congress are now working on a constitutional amendment which would restate the first amendment to the Constitution to allow prayer and Bible reading in schools on a voluntary, nonsectarian basis. The amendment would also head off suits now pending to eliminate God from the Pledge of Allegiance and our coins.

I believe the great majority of American people are behind this action and should say so to their Congressmen in no uncertain words.

Meanwhile, the situation which was created by court action can be corrected by court action. Those who have made the long, difficult, complicated, expensive journey to the U.S. Supreme Court to eliminate God from our schools traveled with the aid of organizations and individuals who shared their goal. Others who share opposite goals must be willing to travel a similar arduous road if they wish to regain what they treasure.

Actually the Court decision can become a challenge for a new spiritual creativity in schools and public life. From school board to the principals to the teachers there could be a rethinking of ways to teach children our basic concepts of morality and God. We are not concerned here merely with a legal debate on whether religion in the schools violates the words of the first amendment. We are concerned with a way of life, a philosophy and the spiritual character of our culture. We must decide what that character is, then take a stand on it before we have nothing left to stand on.

The human need to seek God, to know God, to love God, and to obey God is older than Abraham, and the effort since Abraham for men to live together under God for their spiritual salvation and the common good is

both natural and necessary. This suddenly cannot be outdated and superfluous, men cannot suddenly become purer moralists than God, although even before Abraham there were men who thought they could.

Time and again throughout history, men driven by a lust for power or money have sought to destroy in others the natural response to Divine law—the individual conscience, and the result has been complete chaos. Americans who believe in God are now the prey of such forces, and we shall be their victims unless we do something now to prevent it.

Often I think of the young lawyer who wanted to have our national motto—In God We Trust—removed from our courtrooms. When we stop trusting in God, when we reject the principle that we are His creatures, subject to His laws, when we switch from morality under God to morality by government committees on ethics, we will witness more than the end of law and order in our country. We will witness the end of our country itself. This is a challenge to every one of us who loves freedom—and God.

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A REPORT ON VIETNAM

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I was pleased to attend sessions on the annual meeting of the Association of the U.S. Army, held here in Washington during the week of October 21. In one of these sessions a very informative and interesting presentation was made on the use of American personnel and equipment in fighting Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam. The address, entitled "Report on Vietnam," was delivered on October 23, 1963, by Brig. Gen. Frank A. Osmanski, of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. He is a native of Nanticoke, Pa., and has been in Vietnam since March of 1963. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that this report be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of these remarks.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REPORT ON VIETNAM

(Presentation by Brig. Gen. Frank A. Osmanski, J-4 MACV to annual meeting of the Association of the U.S. Army at Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D.C., October 23, 1963)

This report on Vietnam will be neither profound nor prophetic but the optimism it will reflect sincerely is genuinely that of General Harkins, whose greetings I am charged to bring to this conference.

General Collins has explained this strategic importance of the Republic of Vietnam.

I shall report on the military situation there, under four headings: "Terrain, Weather, and Enemy"; "Friendly Forces"; "Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics"; and "Results to Date."

TERRAIN, WEATHER, AND ENEMY

The Republic of Vietnam comprises three terrain regions: the central highlands, the central lowlands, and the Mekong Delta. The highlands are virgin country with tropical rain and bamboo forests and a broad grassy plateau at their center; inhabited by mountain migratory tribesmen; with a climate conducive to tea, coffee, and a little rice. The lowlands are a generally dry coastal plain with sand dune growths; a sedentary agrarian people; and insufficient rice for lack of water. The delta has bountiful rice paddies, a coastline of mangrove swamps, a central plain of reeds, and a maze of canals; is peopled by scattered rice-farmers and fishermen; and its heavy seasonal rainfall causes annual flooding. The

nature of the counter-insurgency is vastly different in each of these regions.

The weather in the Republic of Vietnam is hot and humid, with two distinct seasons, wet and dry, which vary by region in response principally to two monsoons annually. Rainfall and sunshine are alternately intense, temperatures average 80° Fahrenheit, and there are about 10 typhoons a year and frequent high winds.

The enemy is the Vietcong, the VC, meaning Vietnamese Communist, for which cadres and arms caches were left behind when Ho Chi Minh ostensibly led his followers north in 1954. VC forces are of three strata: hard-core, guerrillas, and porters. Hard-core companies are outfitted in khaki twill with steel or bamboo helmets and carry modern United States or bloc-country arms. Guerrillas wear the standard dress of the Vietnamese peasant, black cotton or satin pajamas, and carry obsolescent French or self-manufactured weapons. Porters wear as little as a loincloth and are unarmed. VC nonexplosive weapons include caltrops, spike-traps, poisoned darts, and even enraged water buffaloes. In a sense their physical endurance, patience, and ingenuity are also VC weapons, for they have been known to live in dark tunnels for weeks, to remain underwater for long periods by breathing through hollow reeds, and to lie in ambush for as long as 48 hours. The VC wage their war from their ancestral strongholds in the U Minh Ha Forest, Plaine des Jones, war zones C and D, and the Do Xa area; and from trackless provinces which they dominate, myriad small hidden bases, deep caves and long tunnels, and other safe havens. VC-initiated incidents are of four types: propaganda, terrorism, sabotage, and armed attacks. Their logistic support is from five sources: levy on the peasantry, import from other countries, capture from Government of Vietnam (GVN) forces, local purchase, and self-production.

FRIENDLY FORCES

The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) consist of a regular army, air force, and navy (including a marine corps) and three paramilitary forces: the civil guard, self-defense corps, and special forces. In addition there are the civilian irregular defense groups (CIDG), including hamlet militia, mountain scouts, border surveillance units, and trail watchers; and then such semiautonomous but gun-bearing patriotic organizations as the Republican Youth, Catholic Youth, and Women's Solidarity Movement. Assisting and advising these are the U.S. Military Assistance Command of about 14,000 and a small Australian Army Training Team. Collaterally the civilian field agencies of the GVN ministries, the U.S. Operations Mission and the U.S. Information Service contribute to the civil aspects of the counterinsurgency. In gross numbers the military, paramilitary, and police forces of the counter-insurgency outnumber the VC about 5 to 1.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

The strategy of the counter-insurgency is three-pronged: the strategic hamlet program, field operations, and psychological operations and civic action.

These three methods intermingle. In essence, the strategy is to win battles and to win people.

The strategic hamlet program is the Republic of Vietnam's national program to physically and ideologically separate the people from the VC and to win their support and confidence by providing them security, democratic government, and social and economic development. The program consists of (1) clear and hold operations, (2) province rehabilitation, and (3) portions of the CIDG program.

Clear and hold operations clear the VC from, and deny them, a specified area intended as the site of a strategic hamlet.

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Province rehabilitation executes Province-prepared and nationally approved civil-military plans providing financial and supply support for the establishment of strategic hamlets.

Those portions of the CIDG program associated with the strategic hamlet program are designed to develop home-defense units for strategic hamlets.

Strategic hamlets, originally conceived as a defense against VC attack, now have become a means for effecting political, economic, and social progress. The Government of Vietnam has recognized this development and considers that the strategic hamlet is primarily the point of impact of a political and social revolution which will serve as a foundation for economic progress.

Field operations are directed variously at securing sites for strategic hamlets, destroying the VC logistic structure, killing or capturing VC's, or gaining or regaining control of Government of Vietnam territory. They are of three basic types:

(1) Clear and hold operations, executed in direct support of the strategic hamlet program, with the mission to clear an area of, and deny it to, the VC during the construction phase of a strategic hamlet.

(2) Fix and destroy operations, based on specific intelligence, with the mission to contact and destroy VC forces or installations; and

(3) Search and clear operations, with the mission to destroy or clear VC from an area of suspected activity. In addition, reconnaissance, security, and search and rescue operations and ambushes are conducted.

Psychological operations and civic action each consist of two related programs. Psychological operations are aimed, first, at supporting the strategic hamlet program by rationalizing the need for rural citizens to move to, or at least to organize into, a more secure locality and by providing them the incentive toward self-development for political, social, and economic improvement. The other aspect of psychological operations is directed at the softer strata of the VC, to whom radio and loudspeaker broadcasts and airdropped or artillery-fired leaflets are aimed, primarily to induce them to avail themselves of chieu hoi, the "open arms" or "welcome home" amnesty program.

Civic action is aimed at improving the socio-economic welfare, political integration, and personal security of the citizenry through Federal support, education, and self-help. Its two basic programs are civic action proper and medical civic action. Civic action proper advises, trains, and assists hamlet inhabitants in setting up local government and trains both the hamlet administrators and citizenry in building and establishing physical facilities such as marketplaces, schools, dispensaries, information centers, chapels, pagodas, and water supply points and in formulating and administering programs of self-help and scientific improvement in education, agriculture, stock-raising, and disease control. Medical civic action trains local nurses and directly treats local people. To date almost 600,000 treatments have been given by medical civic action teams at an average cost of \$1 each. Coordinated with the supporting U.S. military medical civic action program are the USOM medical projects as well as Medico-CARE and Hope.

The tactical principles and techniques which are proving successful in the counterinsurgency are essentially those, especially of small-unit tactics, which have been taught in U.S. service schools for years. The tactical problem remains to find, fix, and destroy the enemy. Of prime importance in the tactical operations of the counterinsurgency is the airborne strike. To explain this here is a short film.

(SB-6: "U.S. Army Helicopter Operations in Vietnam," edited to 13½ minutes.)

RESULTS

The military events of this past year in the Republic of Vietnam have contributed substantially both to the development of improved counterinsurgency techniques and toward ultimate victory for the Republic of Vietnam.

In order that its training advice to the Republic of Vietnam AF may be effective and timely, MAAG-Vietnam publishes a series of "Lessons Learned," which are the after-action distillate from both the extolable and deplorable experiences of actual combat. In the main they reiterate and re-emphasize the time-tested fundamentals taught in current U.S. military doctrine at our service schools. With content particularly derived from counterinsurgency experience in Republic of Vietnam are lessons learned about U.S. Army helicopter operations, M-113 operations, Vietcong ambushes, organization and employment of artillery, province rehabilitation operations, psy war and civic action, the limitations of paramilitary forces such as the CG, SDC, and hamlet militia, and guidelines to U.S. advisers with Allied forces.

MAAG-Vietnam also has published and keeps current a manual on the "Tactics and Techniques of Counter-Insurgency Operations," which is excellent.

Under the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (Comusmacv) there is a Joint Operations Evaluation Group, Vietnam (JOEG-V), whose director has two functions: first, to represent the U.S. Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in the combined U.S.-RVN Combat Development and Test Center-Vietnam (CDTC-V); and, second, to evaluate from the U.S. joint viewpoint the results of tests conducted by CDTC-V and the two U.S. service test agencies in RVN: the U.S. Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) and the U.S. Air Force Test Unit (AFTU). The more significant of their tests of equipment and tactics are the following:

In May of this year test was completed of a version of the C-123 aircraft, modified to shorten landings. This aircraft demonstrated improved capabilities to carry heavy loads into short fields.

Another test project completed by the Air Force, in which the Army was interested, was that of the U-10B helio-courier plane. Its report recommended that further test and evaluation be conducted to select an aircraft better suited to perform the counterinsurgency mission.

The AR-15 Armalite rifle is still being tested in the Republic of Vietnam. Prospects for its wider use are favorable.

Motor convoys in RVN are frequently subjected to costly ambushes, in some of which U.S. advisors have been killed. These ambushes are extremely short in duration and characterized by murderous fire from VC automatic weapons. Countermeasures are being developed to enable troops to survive the withering fire of these ambushes and to launch a superior barrage of area fire in return. New techniques for moving and escorting convoys are being explored and new weapons systems are being developed.

Communications are often a problem in RVN because the terrain or atmospheric conditions tend to limit the range and performance of standard radio sets. A new family of radio antennas, which can be fabricated locally and used with the standard radio sets already issued, is being developed to overcome this problem.

The U.S. Air Force Test Unit is also in the process of testing a tactical air positioning system (TAPS) and a tactical air control system (TACS), the results from which are still pending.

The ACTIV test program so far has been concerned with four general areas of operation: Army aircraft, armored personnel carriers, Army engineering know-how, and

Army communications and electronics equipment.

In the field of Army aviation, there have been significant evaluations of the operation of armed helicopters, Mohawks, and Caribous. It has been found that these aircraft substantially enhance the operational capabilities of the ground forces and that they can survive in a counter-insurgency environment, that indeed the losses have been remarkably low when measured against sorties and hours flown or missions successfully accomplished.

Perhaps the most interesting test conducted to date has been that of the armed helicopter, along the lines of the film just shown. ComUSmacv has on numerous occasions paid tribute to the outstanding accomplishments of Army and Marine helicopter units, both armed and transport, in support of the counterinsurgency.

The testing of the Mohawk in target acquisition continues in the southern part of Vietnam, following the completion of initial tests in a surveillance role in the north. The tests have demonstrated that a limited number of Mohawk aircraft, decentralized and placed under the control of the division, are compatible with ground operations and that this aircraft is well suited for the accomplishment of the full range of counterinsurgency reconnaissance missions, excepting those requiring large area coverage.

Caribou's, as used in RVN for tactical transport of troops and materiel, have proved to be exceptionally versatile because of their capability to take off and land on short, unimproved runways without damaging them. At present the Caribous in the Republic of Vietnam are assigned to the southeast Asia airlift system but so far some of them have invariably been further allocated to the direct support of the U.S. senior corps advisers. These Caribous are proving to be effective in both the forward area transport and centralized airlift roles.

In the field of armored personnel carrier utilization, both M-113's and M-114's were tested. M-113's are used in Republic of Vietnam both for their intended purposes and in the role of tanks, which is feasible because the Vietcong lack armor and antitank weapons. However, numerous modifications have had to be made to transform the M-113 into a more suitable counterinsurgency fighting vehicle. To protect machine guns mounted on it, the M-113 has been modified with a gun shield and cupola. The M-113 has performed well, particularly in the flat rice paddies of the Mekong Delta, where its cross-country mobility was hampered only by the many canals. To overcome this obstacle, several techniques have been developed, among them brush fill, block and tackle, capstan and anchor, aluminum balk bridging, and push bars. On the other hand, the M-114, although present in Republic of Vietnam, has not been employed nearly so extensively as the M-113. As a first generation vehicle, several changes will be required before it will achieve full operational compatibility with the M-113, a third generation vehicle.

Among the most productive of ACTIV's evaluations has been the test of U.S. Army engineer teams, called engineer control and advisory detachments (ECAD's), which have been introduced to provide engineering assistance and direction for small construction projects of benefit to the rural population. Materials for the ECAD's projects were supplied by ACTIV, USOM, and the local government at minimal cost and labor was provided by local civilians. During the 120-day period of the test, 2 ECAD's supervised the construction of 96 projects ranging from simple pigsties to a 200-foot bridge. It has been concluded from their activities, as well as from the activities of the parallel U.S. Navy Seabee training advisory teams (STATS), that small, well-trained engineer-

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ing teams can successfully implement civic action aspects of counter-insurgency operations.

In the area of communications and electronics, ACTIV has been engaged in confirming the suitability of current communications doctrine and developing new concepts, techniques, and hardware for use in counter-insurgency operations, such as a new helicopter command post utilizing the UH-1B helicopter equipped with additional radio equipment, a helicopter public address set for psychological operations, a new navigation system for Army helicopters, and the introduction of high frequency single-sideband radios into Army aircraft.

Now, a note about U.S. Army helicopter maintenance, which plagued all Army personnel for the first 6 months after the introduction of the CH-21's into the Republic of Vietnam. The maintenance problems which have arisen have been concerned essentially with defective rotor blades, engines, and control cables in the CH-21's and, more recently, with drag-struts and magneto assembly arms in the CV-2B's and main mast bearings in the UH-1B's. These problems have all been solved so that, whereas a year ago the CH-21's were operating at about 50 percent average availability for about 25 hours average flying each per month, the present averages for all U.S. Army aircraft in the Republic of Vietnam are 70 percent and 50 hours, with twice the original numbers of aircraft now on hand.

About a year ago it was discerned that all programs necessary to the winning of the counter-insurgency would by spring 1963 be either completed or in process definitely toward satisfactory completion. The MAAG advisory detachments had in the preceding year expanded manifold, had extended down to battalion level, and were being effective in advising, persuading, and assisting the RVNAF toward victory. The combat intelligence network was complete and tied together with adequate communications. Additional U.S. aviation units and MAP-provided armored personnel carriers had enhanced the mobility of the RVNAF. Adequate sealift and airlift systems would soon be established and operating on a combined basis for the movements support of operations. The formal training of the RVNAF was well underway, oriented on such subjects as security, shooting, small unit tactics, and lessons learned from recent operations. The program to resettle the Montagnards and train them into hamlet militia, strike forces, trail watchers, and scout detachments were in full swing. U.S. Special Forces detachments had been introduced in significant numbers and Vietnamese Special Forces were being developed. The CIDG forces were being trained. Modern battle equipment was in country. The strategic hamlet program had been formalized and was beginning to be put on a planned basis with programmed support. It all asked to be used in a concerted effort to beat the VC.

The national campaign plan was conceived to concert that effort. All ministries of the Government of Vietnam, branches of the Republic of Vietnam NAF, and allied supporting agencies were cooperatively and coordinately to intensify their actions to help defeat the Vietcong. Significant progress can now be reported.

The intensity of operations measured in terms of the percentage of available forces on the average engaged in daily combat, has been rising steadily, to the point where it is now about 2½ times what it was a year ago.

In the last months Republic of Vietnam AF operations of battalion or larger size have at times doubled in number over what they had been when the NCP was initiated and small-unit actions have increased by 50 percent. On the other hand, Vietcong-initiated actions have remained essentially

unchanged in numbers. Republic of Vietnam-initiated operations outnumber Vietcong-initiated incidents about 10 to 1.

Secret bases of the Vietcong which had not been entered by other than the Vietcong in 14 years have since been reconnoitered, invaded, and fought through with signal success.

Vietcong casualties have been considerably higher than those of the Republic of Vietnam NAF, with an overall favorable ratio of about 4 to 1 for killed in action and 3 to 2 overall.

Losses of weapons have averaged close to even on both sides. While, admittedly, the weapons being lost to the Vietcong are better quality than the crude home-made ones being captured from them, the loss of any weapon by the Vietcong is more nearly disastrous to them than is the loss of even a fine weapon to the Republic of Vietnam NAF because of the great disparity in supporting logistic systems.

Whereas the volume of Vietcong anti-aircraft fire seems to be increasing and the quality of VC anti-aircraft weapons may be improving, it is still limited principally to .30 caliber rifles and only a few machine-guns.

The Vietcong are limited logistically for food and medicines in the highlands and for weapons everywhere; and they are gradually losing the support of the people as sources of funds, intelligence, and recruits.

Defectors from the Vietcong are surrendering themselves at a rate twice what it was a year ago. On the other hand, the rate of Republic of Vietnam AF desertions has steadily decreased. Moreover, villagers are now more readily disclosing information of the Vietcong to the Republic of Vietnam AF and the provincial administrators.

The Chieu Hoi program is swelling with returnees who wish to forswear and repent their misadventures into communism.

While infiltration of Vietcong personnel and material is known to take place, the exact volume and trend are still imponderables. Nevertheless, large groups and quantities are not involved, the infiltration of cadres is dropping significantly, and smuggling is the biggest problem.

The strategic hamlet program has progressed from 40 percent of hamlets completed and 45 percent of population included as of January 1, 1963, to a present position of about 75 percent completion both as to construction and population included, with another about 15 percent currently under construction. Although the program will soon be completed, much still remains to be done to bring some of the earlier hamlet construction and organization up to more recently established standards.

Most significantly of all, the Government of Vietnam gained in the year between July 1962 and July 1963 some 6 percent in effective control of the rural population whereas the Vietcong during the same period lost 10 percent. (The apparent discrepancy of 4 percent is a gain in the neutral or undecided category, wherein the population have switched at least from being Vietcong-oriented to being neutral, in effect a further gain for the Government of Vietnam.)

The Government of Vietnam gain in area control is less spectacular, only 1 percent in the past year; in fact, in a sense, it is overshadowed by a Vietcong statistical gain of 5 percent in the neutral or previously uncontrolled areas. In simple terms, this signifies that the Government of Vietnam has gained in the populated areas—that is, has won people—whereas the Vietcong have extended their control over relatively uninhabited areas—that is, has gained control of empty territory.

The security of road movement is a cogent index to gains by the Government of Vietnam. Many roads which a year ago were death traps by ambush are now traveled reg-

ularly by unescorted or lightly escorted Republic of Vietnam AF military convoys.

The railroad, too, is now more fully used. Whereas until September 1962 all night traffic had been suspended for fear of attack from ambush, trains now run 24 hours every day.

There are economic indicators also of Government of Vietnam gain in the past year; rice is again available for export and its price is stable.

Finally, despite some recent distractions caused by the Buddhist and student demonstrations and the rumors of coups, the attitude of the Government of Vietnam and of its public servants is definitely in the vein to solve, in this order of priority, its dominant problems of communism, disunity, and underdevelopment.

There have, of course, been costs for this progress, some of them serious. Whereas strategic hamlets are being built at an average cost of only about \$5 per person accommodated, there are more than 1,000 Vietnamese casualties monthly; and U.S. casualties in personnel and aircraft have not been insignificant.

For the 21 months between January 1, 1962, and October 15, 1963, there were 63 U.S. killed, 348 U.S. wounded, and 5 U.S. missing; and for the 9 months between January 1963 and October 1963, while many U.S. aircraft were shot down or crashed, not all were lost.

Finally, what of the prospect for ultimate victory? In January 1963, Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, predicted here in Washington that the counterinsurgency in RVN would be won "within 3 years." General Harkins is on record as saying he considers that a "realistic target date" but "believes we can do even better." More recently, Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported to President Kennedy "their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task (in the Republic of Vietnam) can be completed by the end of 1965." General Don, Acting Chief of the Joint General Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, declared just 2 weeks ago that victory will be achieved in the war against the Vietcong in 1964. These stand as the authoritative predictions.

The remaining battles will be fought most savagely in the delta, the traditional stronghold of the Vietcong, where they are most numerous and deeply entrenched, where strategic hamlets are the most difficult to build and the program for building them got off to a late and sporadic start, and where counter-insurgency operations are the most strenuous and the death throes of the Vietcong will be most violent. It is there that the toughest fighting and the fiercest Vietcong reactions are still in prospect before final victory will be won.

RECESS

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the order previously entered, that the Senate stand in recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 7 o'clock and 15 minutes p.m.) the Senate took a recess, under the order previously entered, until tomorrow, Thursday, November 7, 1963, at 12 o'clock meridian.

CONFIRMATION

Executive nomination confirmed by the Senate November 6 (legislative day of October 22), 1963:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Douglas Henderson, of Massachusetts, a Foreign Service officer of class 2, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Bolivia.

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citizens be liberal; it is not enough that the representative of conservative-voting citizens be conservative.

While the great Edmund Burke was in a race to be elected from Bristol to the House of Commons, he said, in effect, to the voters: "My opponent promises that if elected he will vote according to your will, as you choose. I can only promise to inform myself on issues and to vote as an informed conscience directs." A thoroughly informed conscience is a rarity.

I have known RALPH YARBOROUGH as friend and man for many years. He is perhaps the best read man that Texas has ever sent to Washington. His cultivated and disciplined mind is always seeking information on subjects that Government must act upon. Like other individuals, he travels in a certain direction, but his mind is not closed to facts and conditions warranting a change of mind. The power of intellect to weigh knowledge and to judge justly is his.

We are all for gain. I myself should not always promise and vote as Senator RALPH YARBOROUGH has promised and voted, but mark this: The only gain he has ever sought, consistently or inconsistently, has been public gain. He does not try to milk the public for private profit. He seeks the good of people. Nor is his consideration of humanity provincial minded.

Every man and every woman is judged by his or her sense of values. Whenever the majority of others in any democracy have a high sense of values that country will have become a Utopia. When values of life—values beyond money, values that express civilization, enlightenment, and justice for the human race come up, we can count on Senator RALPH YARBOROUGH to stand for those values.

I salute him for his sense of civilized values, for his sense of justice, for his enlightened intellect, for his decency as a human being, and for his integrity.

The Turn in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CHARLES B. HOEVEN

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following editorial from the November 4, 1963, edition of the Wall Street Journal:

THE TURN IN VIETNAM

Whether the forcible overthrow of the Diem regime bodes good or ill no man can now say. What it does do is leave a lot of important questions unanswered about southeast Asia and U.S. foreign policy in general.

At the moment, Washington seems pleased at the turn of events, despite the apparent assassinations of President Diem and his brother. And it is at least moderately encouraging that the military leaders in South Vietnam are pledged to turn the Government over to civilians under more democratic auspices than prevailed under Diem, and to prosecute the war against the Communists more forcefully.

But let no one, including Washington, forget that this is a military coup, in defiance of a solemn constitution, the very thing which Washington bitterly deplores when it occurs in Latin America. Moreover, the U.S. Government was heavily involved in it, whether it engineered the overthrow

or not. At a minimum, the U.S. Government used its pressures to encourage an uprising.

We do not say this is necessarily avoidable. South Vietnam would long since have fallen to the Communists were it not for the deep U.S. commitment of troops and money. If that is the kind of thing we must do, then it only stands to reason that we must use our force not only against the Communists but to insure, as best we can, that political chaos does not sabotage that effort. Indeed, one of the more hopeful prospects is that perhaps now we and Vietnam can get on with the main business.

What is less edifying is the draft which we have permitted for years in southeast Asia. We gave up in Laos, which is understandable in the circumstances, but the U.S. Government didn't have to try to fool the people by calling it a sound settlement.

In Vietnam the United States couldn't seem to figure out what it was doing. It is at least conceivable that a more adept diplomacy, plus the same kinds of pressures used in the present instance, could have softened the Vietnamese political troubles and hence averted the coup. In retrospect it appears as though our Government had never heard of Buddhists until they started rioting last May.

That is the dismaying thing, not only about Vietnam but almost every other foreign policy matter. The Government seems to be constantly taken by surprise by events, even when it may have been partly instrumental in bringing them about.

The State Department can't seem to understand De Gaulle until he starts acting as many predicted he would. The United States constantly confuses Europe with policy switches and the only conclusion is that the U.S. Government itself is confused, even with all its resources of money, intelligence gathering and political leverage.

We profoundly hope the Vietnam coup will turn out to be a victory for the Vietnamese people and the struggle against communism. It is difficult to see it as a manifestation of a farsighted American foreign policy.

Stockpile Ruckus

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN J. WILLIAMS

OF DELAWARE

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD an editorial entitled "Stockpile Ruckus," which was published yesterday in the Washington Daily News.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STOCKPILE RUCKUS

After more than 20 months of noisy complaints, a Senate subcommittee has produced a bill theoretically designed to make some sense of the Government's enormous stockpile program.

This program was begun after World War II in an avowed effort to assure that in event of a new war the country would be supplied with critical materials—instead of having to scrounge desperately for its war needs after hostilities had begun.

The idea was sound, but like so many good ideas it ran into excesses. Senator STUART SYMINGTON, who headed the investigation sparked by President Kennedy, emphasizes

charges of what the President called unconscionable profits. But the President also complained that the stockpile had an excess supply, worth \$3.4 billion, which he said "astonished" him.

The latest report of Congress Joint Committee on Nonessential Expenditures covers the stockpile program for last June. It shows that in this month the overall stocks were slightly reduced.

But in the same month, according to the Joint Committee, the Government bought more aluminum, bauxite, bismuth, chromite, industrial diamonds, fluorspar, graphite, lead, mica, tantalum, thorium, tungsten, and zinc—although all of these materials already were in excess.

If the stockpile excesses were as astonishing as the President and Senator SYMINGTON have been saying, how is it this situation is being corrected by making it worse? What goes on here?

Some Pertinent Questions on Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, many questions remain unanswered on the events of recent days in Vietnam.

Although press accounts are now supplying us with more information on the coup which ousted the Diem regime and subsequent takeover by the military junta, the extent of U.S. involvement has not yet been clarified by the State Department and other interested Federal agencies.

On Monday I asked some questions on the Vietnam situation in a speech on the floor of the House. Today I wish to suggest additional questions which require answers.

Was the advisability of a coup against Diem and the U.S. role in such a development the subject of high-level discussions subsequent to the August 20 raid on Buddhist pagodas?

When the decision was made to curtail U.S. economic and military assistance to the Diem regime, was consideration given to the effect such action might have in encouraging the military to perpetrate a coup?

How can our policies toward the ruling junta in South Vietnam be spared with our policies toward ruling juntas in the Dominican Republic and Honduras?

Is it not the policy of the United States to extend asylum to save those whose lives are in danger. Why was Ngo Dinh Can surrendered to the military after the Diem-Nhu experience?

Did Ambassador Lodge go to Vietnam with any instructions which might have made him sympathetic to a coup attempt?

What effect will these developments in Vietnam and U.S. involvement in the coup have on our allies in SEATO, in Europe, and most particularly in Central and South America?

Is there any evidence that the CIA and the DIA might have been working at cross purposes, with one of the agencies

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favoring a coup, and the other opposing? Does there not seem indeed to be a need for a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence to look into these matters?

It is my hope that Members of Congress and the Nation will soon be given the answers to these questions in order to restore faith in the executive departments.

Mr. Joseph Alsop, in two recent columns, has raised some interesting questions and made some pertinent observations on the coup in Vietnam. I commend the attention of my colleagues to Mr. Alsop's columns of November 4, "Farewell to Diem," and November 8, "Blood on Our Hands?"

The articles follow:

FAREWELL TO DIEM

(By Joseph Alsop)

What happened in Saigon was bound to happen, for the tragically simple reason that Ngo Dinh Nhu finally lost all grip on reality, while President Ngo Dinh Diem though sane enough himself, nonetheless saw the outer world through the half-mad eyes of his brother.

Even in Washington, halfway around the world, it is easy to imagine the climate of the last days and weeks of the Diem regime. As long as 2 months ago, when this reporter was in Saigon, the army leaders were already beginning to rally around Gen. Duong Van Minh, because they had already concluded that President Diem's government was no longer viable.

Even then it was clear that if Diem did not take the "needed steps to make his government viable once more," the army leaders would eventually take steps to find a new government. From that time until the grim climax, the preparations for the coup d'etat went forward without interruption, spurred onwards in recent weeks by the cuts in American aid to Vietnam.

The tension must have been all but unbearable in the last fortnight or so. For by then Ngo Dinh Nhu, of course, knew that something was afoot, yet dared not strike preventively for fear of causing a counterstrike; while the coup leaders, of course, knew of Nhu's knowledge, yet neither dared nor desired to turn back. So each side continued without flinching, like mere automata in the hard grip of fate, until the final roar of tank artillery.

This is a sad end. The fashion, nowadays, is to forget the debt owed to Ngo Dinh Diem. Yet Diem alone had the guts to put down the gangster "sets" that the French had used as allies in the Indo-China war. And Diem alone had the sturdiness and determination that assured South Vietnam's survival in the first chaotic years. Without Diem, indeed, Saigon today would almost certainly be ruled from Hanoi. The Communists themselves for years expected South Vietnam to fall to them automatically, like a ripe fruit. They only launched the present civil war when Diem left them no room for doubt that their happy expectations would never be realized.

In those early days, when this reporter was also in Saigon, Diem, the brave nationalist, was the hero of the breastbeaters, and the target for the breastbeaters' indignation were the wicked French colonials, who then hated Diem. But as breastbeaters always need someone or something to be indignant about, and as the French faded from the scene and only Diem was left, the breastbeaters naturally turned on Diem at last.

In truth, the breastbeaters played a major role in this tragedy, not least because they strongly influenced the first American reaction, when the Communists finally gave the signal for a full-scale civil war. As a

sample of the futile twaddle talked in the U.S. Embassy in Saigon at that critical moment, it is only necessary to record one fact.

When the war began in bloody earnest, President Diem decided to arm the civil guard, whose members have suffered more casualties by now than any other force fighting the Communists. Yet for months on end, this decision of Diem's met with angry, obstinate American resistance, on the singular ground that an armed police force did not conform with the best and highest principles of Asian democracy.

The recent tragedy was directly rooted in that time before President Kennedy imposed more order and realism on U.S. policy in Vietnam. Ngo Dinh Nhu, in particular, was permanently warped by his memories of the earlier period. He could never take advantage of the new opportunity that was offered to him in 1961, because he could never quite believe the opportunity was real in view of what had gone before. In the conduct of the war, the team of Ambassador Frederick Nolting and Gen. Paul Harkins made great progress. But in the politics of Saigon, and in his dealings with the United States, Nhu plunged onward from folly to folly, always dragging Diem behind him. And so the end came at last for both Nhu and Diem—the end which might well have been averted by more practical commonsense at the outset.

The question now, it must be added, is whether practical commonsense or the outcries of the breastbeaters are to prevail in Washington. As was unavoidable, the Diem regime has been supplanted by a military junta. Procuring efficient, honest, energetic government from a military junta is not easy at the best of times.

This difficult task will be rendered all but impossible if Washington uses its vast leverage in Saigon to satisfy the breastbeaters, by seeking to stage a virtuous comedy of civil government. Creating a workable civil government in Vietnam is simply not feasible in the midst of civil war. Let the war be won first, as it can be won, and let the Vietnamese settle their own political affairs thereafter. These are the practical rules to follow, whatever the breastbeaters may say.

BLOOD ON OUR HANDS?

(By Joseph Alsop)

The American role in the bloodstained but purgative coup in South Vietnam is a subject demanding serious inquiry, if only because so much bosh is sure to be talked about it unless the facts are understood.

Beginning, then, at the beginning, the American Government was of course aware that the leaders of the Vietnamese Army were talking with one another about ways and means of displacing President Ngo Dinh Diem. Indeed, there was no way to avoid being aware of this.

As long as 2 months ago, when this reporter was in Saigon, he was taken into the confidence of one of the most active organizers of the coup. This member of the future junta listed the other generals who had already placed themselves under the leadership of Gen. Duong Van Minh; he said the coup would come soon; and he actually asked that the information be transmitted at once to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.

Long before the coup occurred, therefore, it was quite clear there was trouble ahead. The expectation of early trouble in fact led Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to send his personal plane to Saigon, so that Ambassador Lodge could make his planned visit to Washington without the extra days away from his post required for travel by the commercial airlines.

That simple fact in turn reveals another aspect of the story. While aware that trouble was brewing, the U.S. Government was in no sense a party to the preparations for the

coup. Otherwise, the plan would never have been made for this Lodge trip to Washington, which was so abruptly forestalled when the coup took place.

Until the very eve of the coup, moreover, Ambassador Lodge continued his fruitless effort to persuade President Diem to set his house in order. His last attempt was made on Sunday, October 27, when Diem invited Lodge to join him on a visit of inspection in the countryside.

The long day with Diem gave the Ambassador the opportunity to discuss both the state of affairs in Vietnam, and its effects on United States-Vietnamese relations, in detail and at great length. He offered a list of modest but significant steps which Diem could take to relax the tension in Saigon, and to improve the climate in Washington. Every item on the Lodge list was categorically vetoed by Diem.

Lodge then asked Diem whether he had any suggestions of his own about possible means of escape from the impasse. Diem merely gave the Ambassador "a blank look and changed the subject," as Lodge subsequently reported. Yet on Monday Lodge returned to the attack with Diem's intelligent and flexible Minister of Defense, Nguyen Dinh Thuan.

Thuan, who described the program pressed by Lodge on Diem as "extremely moderate," promised to go to Diem and see whether his persuasions would have any effect. His first report was decidedly encouraging. But the second report from Thuan, the next day, was a gloomy, final negative. Diem's brother, the all-powerful and half-mad Ngo Dinh Nhu, had had his say in the interval.

In short, there was no way to save Diem and Nhu from themselves. Or rather, there was only one way. It was indicated to Secretary McNamara just before he left Vietnam by the able Englishman, Prof. Patrick Honey, who is the unusual expert on Vietnam without a personal ox to grind.

"You must understand," Honey told McNamara, "that the Diem regime will surely be destroyed by a coup unless the U.S. Government makes a ringing reassertion of confidence in Diem and support for his government as soon as you get back to Washington."

McNamara gave Honey's judgment to President Kennedy as his own judgment. But no reassertion of confidence in the Diem regime was possible, simply because the U.S. Government had quite rightly lost confidence in the Diem regime.

Such are the facts. They constitute an interesting moral problem. On the one hand, the U.S. Government had foreknowledge that a coup was being considered. In addition, the U.S. Government could have forestalled the coup—by stultifying itself. But the U.S. Government refused to stultify itself. Diem refused to put his house in order. And so the coup took place.

Resolution Adopted by the Board of
Trustees of the Unitarian Universalist
Association on October 14, 1963

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. NEIL STAEBLER

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. STAEBLER. Mr. Speaker, the board of trustees of the Unitarian Universalist Association on October 14 adopted a resolution urging that Con-

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higher on these items. Experts predict that if the Federal bill is passed it will raise prices in non-fair-trade States by 20 to 30 percent.

ADD BILLIONS TO BUDGET

The home consumer is not the only one who would be hurt by this legislation. The Defense Department believes that passage of this bill would add billions of dollars to the country's defense budget for the 1964 fiscal year.

The AFL-CIO has testified against the bill, pointing out that it would cost consumers \$14 billion a year.

Other groups that have come out against it include the National Farmers Union, the National Council of Senior Citizens, the Chamber of Commerce, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Federal Trade Commission, the Commerce Department, and the State Department.

It seems almost incredible that the House Commerce Committee has already approved this bill, and the Senate Commerce Committee, now holding hearings on the measure, may do the same.

Dozens of newspapers throughout the country have carried editorials condemning the inflationary effects of this price-fixing bill, but none we have seen puts it more succinctly than the New York Herald-Tribune which said:

"When corporate executives get together in a smoky hotel room and agree not to undercut one another's prices, that's called a conspiracy and the executives are sent to jail. When they attempt to do the same thing by law—and require everybody to go along—that's called fair trade. When Congressmen seek to disguise 'fair trade' as 'quality stabilization' that's called politics. Though consumers—and that includes all the voters—might be excused for using earthier terms."

We call it "stealing"—from the consumer's pocketbook.

Diem's Last Interview

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. EDNA F. KELLY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, Ngo Dinh Diem, the late President of Vietnam, has gone to his eternal rest. His death—especially the tragic circumstances surrounding it—should grieve us deeply. In his passing, we have lost a true and loyal friend. And the free world, whose distant ramparts he had defended in that remote forefront of the bloody, physical struggle with communism, has lost a proven ally and a champion.

Nine years have passed since the day when Ngo Dinh Diem, returning from political exile, took over the reins of the government of the newly created state of South Vietnam. With a firm hand and steady purpose, with dedication seldom matched in current history, and with fervent nationalistic zeal which transcended considerations of personal gain, he struggled against overwhelming odds to weld the divergent elements of the Vietnamese population into a nation, to create an effective central government, to rid his homeland of the sores of Communist infiltration, and to hold back the tide of communism moving persistently

from the north. In an area of the world beset by centuries-old problems, rendered by repeated invasions and partitions, sapped by ancient rivalries and weaknesses, he alone—and then his infant nation—stood firm on the side of freedom, striving to attain in South Vietnam that degree of internal security which is necessary for the free exercise of human rights.

It was because of these qualities of Ngo Dinh Diem, and because our national and free world interests in that part of the globe coincided with his goals, that the United States sought to assist Diem in his struggle. We have provided his country with massive aid—aid which produced results as one area of Vietnam after another became cleared of Communist guerrillas. And we looked with hope, and anticipation, to the day when the Government of Vietnam would become sufficiently strong to carry on, successfully the fight against the Communists, and our aid could be terminated.

Last weekend, these hopes and expectations suffered a sudden reverse. The military coup d'etat, the barbaric murder of Diem and his brother Nhu, and the reported demand from the military junta for a sharp increase in American aid, raise serious questions regarding the future course of our relations with Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, I am certain that the whole civilized world was overcome with a feeling of revulsion at the act of barbarism which accompanied the rise to power of the self-proclaimed defenders of human rights in Vietnam. The murder of Diem and his brother, the cruel, clumsy attempt to cloak the deed with a label of a suicide, fill one with horror. I believe that our Government must think long and deeply about any commitment to a group of people who would rise to power in this manner. I further believe that the people in and out of our Government should also search their souls and consider to what extent, if any, their words—the intemperate criticisms of the Diem regime, the distorted reports from that area, the biased editorial comments—to what extent these words and deeds, or lack of them, contributed to the tragedy which took place in Saigon last weekend.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge our Government to delay extending recognition to the military junta in Vietnam until a thorough review and reassessment of our policy with respect to southeast Asia is accomplished. We must consider what effect our continued aid to Vietnam will have on that entire area. And we must decide anew whether American aid—particularly aid on such large scale—is warranted in the light of recent events. Our resources, surely, are not inexhaustible. They must be used in a manner, and in places, where their use will contribute most to the attainment of the overall goals of our foreign policy: the establishment of order, and of peace with justice and freedom, among peoples who seek the same objectives. It is only under those conditions that the expenditure of our public funds can carry forward the work begun with the sacrifice of American lives and the lives of others who, like

Diem, believed in working for and fighting for freedom.

Mr. Speaker, I insert in the Record the following article which appeared in the New York Journal of November 5, 1963, entitled "Diem's Last Interview," which was written by Bob Considine. I ask, Why did Ambassador Lodge portray the views expressed in paragraph 4 contradicting the facts found by the Hearst task force? I ask, From what source did he receive these views?

The article follows:

DIEM'S LAST INTERVIEW

(By Bob Considine)

President Diem's last interview was with the Hearst task force, just a little over month ago.

The resident correspondents in Saigon, most of whom had not been able to get in to see him, badgered us a bit before we saw him.

"Good luck," one said. "With any kind of a break you should be able to get out of the palace in 4 hours. Also, you'd better go to the bathroom before you start. There won't be any breaks. And if you expect a drink, forget it. You'll be lucky if he serves you tea."

Ambassador Lodge took a dim view. He said we'd find him an old and beaten man who had lost his grip on the situation, uncertain of his future course and all that sort of thing.

We had to wait a bit for Diem in Gia Long palace, now a battered ruin. An aid said that the president was momentarily tied up, putting the finishing touches on a speech he was to deliver later on Confucius. When he bounced in to greet us, he brimmed with vigor. He was everything Ambassador Lodge had said he wasn't.

Diem spoke to us in French, except for one sentence. Suddenly restless with the game of languages he turned to Bill Hearst and spoke a sentence in perfect English.

The early phases of the interview had to do with his sister-in-law's most recent interview, the one in Rome where she was reported as blasting the younger American officers serving in Vietnam as military advisors. We expected him, somehow, to come forth with a full-breasted endorsement of the American aid effort.

Instead, Diem seemed to hedge a bit. Sorry he had not read the text of Madame's remarks in Rome, and therefore could not comment, could he? Frank Conniff said that was sensible, but how did he, Diem, feel about our men. But he ducked that a bit, too.

"The American officers I've met are good ones, on the whole," he said.

"Did you ever tell her to keep quiet?" I asked him.

Diem shrugged. "She was in Rome this time," he said. "I didn't know what she was going to say. But, remember, she is also a deputy. She can speak for herself, just as your Congressmen do."

"But don't you see how bad that sounds to dependents of the men concerned, the mothers and fathers of them, their wives and kids?" Frank pressed him.

"I have always spoken of our foreign friends in a friendly way," Diem answered solemnly. Then the strong bronzed face beneath the shock of raven black hair burst wide open with sudden and radiant laughter.

"It is because I am not married that I have all these troubles."

Once started, Diem was a hard man to turn off. At least a dozen times one of us would say, "Thank you, Mr. President."

But Diem would brush aside the phrase that Marrison Smith of UPI patented and plunge on. But finally we were outside. Two palace guards, probably dead now, beck-

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oned our car up to the front door of the palace. Frank and I got in and sat there for about 10 minutes while Bill Hearst gabbed at the door with Diem's press chief, a Saigon editor. Occasionally, we'd yell for Bill to come along, and in time he did.

"I was telling him," Bill said, "that his boss ought to think a little more about better public relations."

It didn't seem very important as we drove away in the rain.

Mr. Speaker, I also insert in the Record the following paragraph taken from an article in the New York Times of November 6, 1963, written by David Halberstam:

The Buddhist centers of worship, the pagodas, then became centers of political as well as religious unrest.

Here is an admission that the Buddhists were involved in political activities. I ask, Should the action taken by the former Diem regime be attributed to religious persecution when the houses of worship of the Buddhists were used for political activities against a common objective—a war against the Communists? I bring to the attention of my colleagues the fact that President Diem had built for the Buddhists over 1,100 pagodas during the last 8 years of his regime. Do you call that religious persecution?

May I bring to the attention of my colleagues my remarks which appeared in the Record of August 15, 1963. I hope the Members will reread this address and compare those statements with those which are now appearing in the press.

I am sure that no matter what my Government does, it is our earnest hope that we can assist in winning the war against the Communists for the people of Vietnam so that one day they may be able to select a government of their own choosing.

So-Called Working Cruise in the Caribbean by Nine State and Federal Legislators

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. ADAM C. POWELL
OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. POWELL. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I include the following editorial broadcast by Mutual Radio:

According to the New York Herald Tribune, nine State and Federal legislators recently went on a 7-day so-called working cruise in the Caribbean. Yesterday they returned and, says the Trib, at least three of the lawmakers, all of whom were accompanied by their wives, admitted all their expenses had been paid by the New York State Savings Bank Association.

Most of the lawmakers, in one way or another, are concerned with legislation directly affecting savings banks. Most, when asked by Tribune reporters, denied any wrongdoing, and also denied their votes on banking legislation would, in any way, be affected by their cruise, even though they were accompanied by some 925 savings bank ex-

ecutives, their wives, and guests. This may, and probably is, true.

However, the public would have every right to raise its eyebrows at such behavior. It unfortunately places the recipient of such gratuity under a vague cloud of suspicion, no matter what his motives may have been. In politics and government, one can never be too careful or too prudent.

Knifing the U.S. Lunar Project

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. GEORGE P. MILLER
OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I submit herewith an article by the well-known columnist, William S. White, entitled "Knifing the U.S. Lunar Project."

Mr. White points up the fact that the Nation which becomes first in space will undoubtedly become first on the earth and goes on to call Khrushchev's recent statement concerning the Soviet lunar efforts "one of the most successful of all Soviet propaganda strokes."

The article follows:

KNIFING THE U.S. LUNAR PROJECT

(By William S. White)

One of the most successful of all Soviet propaganda strokes has been Nikita Khrushchev's theatrical withdrawal from the race to the moon. The American space program, in consequence, is in grave trouble.

In Congress and among the people—many of whom Mr. Khrushchev is plainly fooling most of the time in this matter—there is a clearly diminished interest in pushing that program, even though never has so vast and so potentially rewarding an enterprise been open to mankind. But would it not cost many billions? Of course, it would; but so did the development of the airplane, of atomic energy, of radio, and television.

Mr. Khrushchev's reasons for his alleged retirement are endlessly debated. But not often has there been a more irrelevant debate, as has been pointed out by one of the most trustworthy experts in this field, Representative OLIN E. TEAGUE, of Texas. For it does not really matter why Mr. Khrushchev has done what apparently he has done. And, parenthetically, if he really has done it, it probably is in simple acceptance of the basic fact that the Russian economy is vastly inferior to that of the United States.

UNDERCUTS U.S. EFFORTS

What is truly and desperately important is the danger that we are about to be talked out of that maximum American effort which is the most vital need of the 20th century and perhaps even of the century to come.

To begin with, the nation which becomes first in space will undoubtedly become first on the earth we inhabit, probably in position to begin to control the weather and possibly even to begin to dominate some part of the infinity which has thus far lain beyond man's understanding.

And, to proceed with the obvious, the effort to reach the moon—as only the current symbol of man's search into these outer mysteries—is already showering out collateral benefits in science which are in themselves beyond price.

Grand and seemingly gradios schemes of this kind, though easy to attack with the

jeering slogan of unlettered cynicism, almost invariably produce returns which a few years later we learn we could not have lived without. Often, these returns are wholly unexpected.

For a relatively small example: The assigned mission of the Eighth U.S. Air Force in England in the Second World War was to destroy German industry with daylight bombing raids. A part of this job was done; but a far more immediately vital and quite unplanned thing was done, too. This was the virtual destruction of the counterattacking German fighter air force—a bonus that may well have saved our D-day invasion from disaster.

AIDS ANTILUNAR BLOC

Mr. Khrushchev's claim that he is getting out of the moon contest has reduced the drama of the thing—which too many people in any event had seen as a kind of high school footrace. But, more damagingly, it has greatly assisted the old coalition against the moon attempt. One of the strangest coalitions we have ever known, it is made up of some conservatives whose proper desire to save money is sadly misplaced here, and some liberals who can rarely lift their minds above welfarist plans for spending every dollar at hand "right here on earth," to use their happily demagogic phrase.

Nothing will change the minds of these liberals. The conservatives, however, ought to ponder what they are about here. For apart from the almost indescribable strategic and scientific significance of this program, there is the bottom fact that it is already nearly indispensable to the American economy and may later become indispensable in the absolute sense.

Automation, when fully launched, will create huge pools of unemployables. Politically, these must and will be cared for, under any foreseeable regime, Republican or Democratic. Is it not better to spend the money for space than to speed the day when all this money and more will have to be thrown about for the most gigantic—and also permanent—leaf-raking schemes in the world's history?

The space program is the precise opposite of economic crackpotism. It is sensible conservatism's greatest future weapon against just such crackpotism.

United States Cuts Off Aid to Honduras

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. STEVEN B. DEROUNIAN
OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. DEROUNIAN. Mr. Speaker, the Kennedy administration has two standards: an anti-Communist overthrow by the government is met with coolness and disdain but when an anti-Communist government is overthrown President Kennedy wants to give immediate recognition. A case in point is the immediate cutoff of aid to Honduras, one of our allies.

A very disturbing article by Dan Kurzman in a dispatch from Honduras follows:

CUTOFF OF U.S. AID A BLOW TO HONDURAS (By Dan Kurzman)

TEGUCIGALPA.—The U.S. decision to cut off aid to Honduras in the wake of the military coup is likely to have a drastic effect on the Honduran economy.

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citizens be liberal; it is not enough that the representative of conservative-voting citizens be conservative.

While the great Edmund Burke was in a race to be elected from Bristol to the House of Commons, he said, in effect, to the voters: "My opponent promises that if elected he will vote according to your will, as you choose. I can only promise to inform myself on issues and to vote as an informed conscience directs." A thoroughly informed conscience is a rarity.

I have known RALPH YARBOROUGH as friend and man for many years. He is perhaps the best read man that Texas has ever sent to Washington. His cultivated and disciplined mind is always seeking information on subjects that Government must act upon. Like other individuals, he travels in a certain direction, but his mind is not closed to facts and conditions warranting a change of mind. The power of intellect to weigh knowledge and to judge justly is his.

We are all for gain. I myself should not always promise and vote as Senator RALPH YARBOROUGH has promised and voted, but mark this: The only gain he has ever sought, consistently or inconsistently, has been public gain. He does not try to milk the public for private profit. He seeks the good of people. Nor is his consideration of humanity provincial minded.

Every man and every woman is judged by his or her sense of values. Whenever the majority of others in any democracy have a high sense of values that country will have become a Utopia. When values of life—values, beyond money, values that express civilization, enlightenment, and justice for the human race come up, we can count on Senator RALPH YARBOROUGH to stand for those values.

I salute him for his sense of civilized values, for his sense of justice, for his enlightened intellect, for his decency as a human being, and for his integrity.

The Turn in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CHARLES B. HOEVEN

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following editorial from the November 4, 1963, edition of the Wall Street Journal:

THE TURN IN VIETNAM

Whether the forcible overthrow of the Diem regime bodes good or ill no man can now say. What it does do is leave a lot of important questions unanswered about southeast Asia and U.S. foreign policy in general.

At the moment, Washington seems pleased at the turn of events, despite the apparent assassinations of President Diem and his brother. And it is at least moderately encouraging that the military leaders in South Vietnam are pledged to turn the Government over to civilians under more democratic auspices than prevailed under Diem, and to prosecute the war against the Communists more forcefully.

But let no one, including Washington, forget that this is a military coup, in defiance of a solemn constitution, the very thing which Washington bitterly deplores when it occurs in Latin America. Moreover, the U.S. Government was heavily involved in it, whether it engineered the overthrow

or not. At a minimum, the U.S. Government used its pressures to encourage an uprising.

We do not say this is necessarily avoidable. South Vietnam would long since have fallen to the Communists were it not for the deep U.S. commitment of troops and money. If that is the kind of thing we must do, then it only stands to reason that we must use our force not only against the Communists but to insure, as best we can, that political chaos does not sabotage that effort. Indeed, one of the more hopeful prospects is that perhaps now we and Vietnam can get on with the main business.

What is less edifying is the draft which we have permitted for years in southeast Asia. We gave up in Laos, which is understandable in the circumstances, but the U.S. Government didn't have to try to fool the people by calling it a sound settlement.

In Vietnam the United States couldn't seem to figure out what it was doing. It is at least conceivable that a more adept diplomacy, plus the same kinds of pressures used in the present instance, could have softened the Vietnamese political troubles and hence averted the coup. In retrospect it appears as though our Government had never heard of Buddhists until they started rioting last May.

That is the dismaying thing, not only about Vietnam but almost every other foreign policy matter. The Government seems to be constantly taken by surprise by events, even when it may have been partly instrumental in bringing them about.

The State Department can't seem to understand De Gaulle until he starts acting as many predicted he would. The United States constantly confuses Europe with policy switches and the only conclusion is that the U.S. Government itself is confused, even with all its resources of money, intelligence gathering and political leverage.

We profoundly hope the Vietnam coup will turn out to be a victory for the Vietnamese people and the struggle against communism. It is difficult to see it as a manifestation of a farsighted American foreign policy.

Stockpile Ruckus

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN J. WILLIAMS

OF DELAWARE

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD an editorial entitled "Stockpile Ruckus," which was published yesterday in the Washington Daily News.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STOCKPILE RUCKUS

After more than 20 months of noisy complaints, a Senate subcommittee has produced a bill theoretically designed to make some sense of the Government's enormous stockpile program.

This program was begun after World War II in an avowed effort to assure that in event of a new war the country would be supplied with critical materials—instead of having to scrounge desperately for its war needs after hostilities had begun.

The idea was sound, but like so many good ideas it ran into excesses. Senator STUART SYMINGTON, who headed the investigation sparked by President Kennedy, emphasizes

charges of what the President called unconscionable profits. But the President also complained that the stockpile had an excess supply, worth \$3.4 billion, which he said "astonished" him.

The latest report of Congress Joint Committee on Nonessential Expenditures covers the stockpile program for last June. It shows that in this month the overall stocks were slightly reduced.

But in the same month, according to the Joint Committee, the Government bought more aluminum, bauxite, blamuth, chromite, industrial diamonds, fluorspar, graphite, lead, mica, tantalum, thorium, tungsten, and zinc—although all of these materials already were in excess.

If the stockpile excesses were as astonishing as the President and Senator SYMINGTON have been saying, how is it this situation is being corrected by making it worse? What goes on here?

Some Pertinent Questions on Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, many questions remain unanswered on the events of recent days in Vietnam.

Although press accounts are now supplying us with more information on the coup which ousted the Diem regime and subsequent takeover by the military junta, the extent of U.S. involvement has not yet been clarified by the State Department and other interested Federal agencies.

On Monday I asked some questions on the Vietnam situation in a speech on the floor of the House. Today I wish to suggest additional questions which require answers.

Was the advisability of a coup against Diem and the U.S. role in such a development the subject of high-level discussions subsequent to the August 20 raid on Buddhist pagodas?

When the decision was made to curtail U.S. economic and military assistance to the Diem regime, was consideration given to the effect such action might have in encouraging the military to perpetrate a coup?

How can our policies toward the ruling junta in South Vietnam be spared with our policies toward ruling juntas in the Dominican Republic and Honduras?

Is it not the policy of the United States to extend asylum to save those whose lives are in danger. Why was Ngo Dinh Can surrendered to the military after the Diem-Nhu experience?

Did Ambassador Lodge go to Vietnam with any instructions which might have made him sympathetic to a coup attempt?

What effect will these developments in Vietnam and U.S. involvement in the coup have on our allies in SEATO, in Europe, and most particularly in Central and South America?

Is there any evidence that the CIA and the DIA might have been working at cross purposes, with one of the agencies

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favoring a coup, and the other opposing? Does there not seem indeed to be a need for a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence to look into these matters?

It is my hope that Members of Congress and the Nation will soon be given the answers to these questions in order to restore faith in the executive departments.

Mr. Joseph Alsop, in two recent columns, has raised some interesting questions and made some pertinent observations on the coup in Vietnam. I commend the attention of my colleagues to Mr. Alsop's columns of November 4, "Farewell to Diem," and November 6, "Blood on Our Hands?"

The articles follow:

FAREWELL TO DIEM
(By Joseph Alsop)

What happened in Saigon was bound to happen, for the tragically simple reason that Ngo Dinh Nhu finally lost all grip on reality, while President Ngo Dinh Diem though sane enough himself, nonetheless saw the outer world through the half-mad eyes of his brother.

Even in Washington, halfway around the world, it is easy to imagine the climate of the last days and weeks of the Diem regime. As long as 2 months ago, when this reporter was in Saigon, the army leaders were already beginning to rally around Gen. Duong Van Minh, because they had already concluded that President Diem's government was no longer viable.

Even then it was clear that if Diem did not take the "needed steps to make his government viable once more," the army leaders would eventually take steps to find a new government. From that time until the grim climax, the preparations for the coup d'etat went forward without interruption, spurred onwards in recent weeks by the cuts in American aid to Vietnam.

The tension must have been all but unbearable in the last fortnight or so. For by then Ngo Dinh Nhu, of course, knew that something was afoot, yet dared not strike preventively for fear of causing a counterstrike; while the coup leaders, of course, knew of Nhu's knowledge, yet neither dared nor desired to turn back. So each side continued without flinching, like mere automata in the hard grip of fate, until the final roar of tank artillery.

This is a sad end. The fashion, nowadays, is to forget the debt owed to Ngo Dinh Diem. Yet Diem alone had the guts to put down the gangster "sets" that the French had used as allies in the Indo-China war. And Diem alone had the sturdiness and determination that assured South Vietnam's survival in the first chaotic years. Without Diem, indeed, Saigon today would almost certainly be ruled from Hanoi. The Communists themselves for years expected South Vietnam to fall to them automatically, like a ripe fruit. They only launched the present civil war when Diem left them no room for doubt that their happy expectations would never be realized.

In those early days, when this reporter was also in Saigon, Diem, the brave nationalist, was the hero of the breastbeaters, and the target for the wicked French colonials, who then hated Diem. But as breastbeaters always need someone or something to be indignant about, and as the French faded from the scene and only Diem was left, the breastbeaters naturally turned on Diem at last.

In truth, the breastbeaters played a major role in this tragedy, not least because they strongly influenced the first American reaction, when the Communists finally gave the signal for a full-scale civil war. As a

sample of the futile twaddle talked in the U.S. Embassy in Saigon at that critical moment, it is only necessary to record one fact.

When the war began in bloody earnest, President Diem decided to arm the civil guard, whose members have suffered more casualties by now than any other force fighting the Communists. Yet for months on end, this decision of Diem's met with angry, obstinate American resistance, on the singular ground that an armed police force did not conform with the best and highest principles of Asian democracy.

The recent tragedy was directly rooted in that time before President Kennedy imposed more order and realism on U.S. policy in Vietnam. Ngo Dinh Nhu, in particular, was permanently warped by his memories of the earlier period. He could never take advantage of the new opportunity that was offered to him in 1961, because he could never quite believe the opportunity was real in view of what had gone before. In the conduct of the war, the team of Ambassador Frederick Nolting and Gen. Paul Harkins made great progress. But in the politics of Saigon, and in his dealings with the United States, Nhu plunged onward from folly to folly, always dragging Diem behind him. And so the end came at last for both Nhu and Diem—the end which might well have been averted by more practical commonsense at the outset.

The question now, it must be added, is whether practical commonsense or the outcries of the breastbeaters are to prevail in Washington. As was unavoidable, the Diem regime has been supplanted by a military junta. Procuring efficient, honest, energetic government from a military junta is not easy at the best of times.

This difficult task will be rendered all but impossible if Washington uses its vast leverage in Saigon to satisfy the breastbeaters, by seeking to stage a virtuous comedy of civil government. Creating a workable civil government in Vietnam is simply not feasible in the midst of civil war. Let the war be won first, as it can be won, and let the Vietnamese settle their own political affairs thereafter. These are the practical rules to follow, whatever the breastbeaters may say.

BLOOD ON OUR HANDS?

(By Joseph Alsop)

The American role in the bloodstained but purgative coup in South Vietnam is a subject demanding serious inquiry, if only because so much bosh is sure to be talked about it unless the facts are understood.

Beginning, then, at the beginning, the American Government was of course aware that the leaders of the Vietnamese Army were talking with one another about ways and means of displacing President Ngo Dinh Diem. Indeed, there was no way to avoid being aware of this.

As long as 2 months ago, when this reporter was in Saigon, he was taken into the confidence of one of the most active organizers of the coup. This member of the future junta listed the other generals who had already placed themselves under the leadership of Gen. Duong Van Minh; he said the coup would come soon; and he actually asked that the information be transmitted at once to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.

Long before the coup occurred, therefore, it was quite clear there was trouble ahead. The expectation of early trouble in fact led Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to send his personal plane to Saigon, so that Ambassador Lodge could make his planned visit to Washington without the extra days away from his post required for travel by the commercial airlines.

That simple fact in turn reveals another aspect of the story. While aware that trouble was brewing, the U.S. Government was in no sense a party to the preparations for the

coup. Otherwise, the plan would never have been made for this Lodge trip to Washington, which was so abruptly forestalled when the coup took place.

Until the very eve of the coup, moreover, Ambassador Lodge continued his fruitless effort to persuade President Diem to set his house in order. His last attempt was made on Sunday, October 27, when Diem invited Lodge to join him on a visit of inspection in the countryside.

The long day with Diem gave the Ambassador the opportunity to discuss both the state of affairs in Vietnam, and its effects on United States-Vietnamese relations, in detail and at great length. He offered a list of modest but significant steps which Diem could take to relax the tension in Saigon, and to improve the climate in Washington. Every item on the Lodge list was categorically vetoed by Diem.

Lodge then asked Diem whether he had any suggestions of his own about possible means of escape from the impasse. Diem merely gave the Ambassador "a blank look and changed the subject," as Lodge subsequently reported. Yet on Monday Lodge returned to the attack with Diem's intelligent and flexible Minister of Defense, Nguyen Dinh Thuan.

Thuan, who described the program pressed by Lodge on Diem as "extremely moderate," promised to go to Diem and see whether his persuasions would have any effect. His first report was decidedly encouraging. But the second report from Thuan, the next day, was a gloomy, final negative. Diem's brother, the all-powerful and half-mad Ngo Dinh Nhu, had had his say in the interval.

In short, there was no way to save Diem and Nhu from themselves. Or rather, there was only one way. It was indicated to Secretary McNamara just before he left Vietnam by the able Englishman, Prof. Patrick Honey, who is the unusual expert on Vietnam without a personal ax to grind.

"You must understand," Honey told McNamara, "that the Diem regime will surely be destroyed by a coup unless the U.S. Government makes a ringing reassertion of confidence in Diem and support for his government as soon as you get back to Washington."

McNamara gave Honey's judgment to President Kennedy as his own judgment. But no reassertion of confidence in the Diem regime was possible, simply because the U.S. Government had quite rightly lost confidence in the Diem regime.

Such are the facts. They constitute an interesting moral problem. On the one hand, the U.S. Government had foreknowledge that a coup was being considered. In addition, the U.S. Government could have forestalled the coup—by stultifying itself. But the U.S. Government refused to stultify itself. Diem refused to put his house in order. And so the coup took place.

Resolution Adopted by the Board of
Trustees of the Unitarian Universalist
Association on October 14, 1963

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. NEIL STAEBLER

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. STAEBLER. Mr. Speaker, the board of trustees of the Unitarian Universalist Association on October 14 adopted a resolution urging that Con-

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years ahead, we might ask why these securities are not canceled? They could be, because they will be held in perpetuity. In truth, the Fed merely holds them, draws the interest from the Treasury, spends all of this interest income it cares to spend, then returns the rest back to the Treasury.

NINETY-NINE PERCENT OF EARNINGS OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS COMES FROM TAXPAYERS WHO HAVE PAID THE BONDS AND INTEREST ONE TIME

Last year the Federal Reserve's total income was \$1,049 millions. Of this amount, \$1,039 millions, or better than 99 percent, came from interest payments from the Treasury, on its holdings of Government obligations—the Treasury paid the System an average interest rate of 3.52 percent. From this income, the Federal Reserve spent or otherwise disposed of \$250 million and returned the other \$799 million to the Treasury. The people are being compelled to pay a billion dollars a year interest on bonds that have already been paid once. It is a subsidy with a vengeance.

IS THIS BEING CONTINUED TO PROTECT FEDERAL RESERVE IN ITS BACK-DOOR SPENDING?

The Federal Reserve System is, we might note, the biggest and most free-wheeling back-door spending operation ever conceived. It spends all the public funds it cares to spend without so much as a by your leave from Congress. It submits no budget; its expenditures are not in the President's budget; and it is not even audited by the General Accounting Office or any other agency of the Government.

GOVERNMENT OWNS FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS

I know that some people have an idea that the private commercial banks own the Federal Reserve banks, and, therefore, own the assets of these banks, including their holdings of Government obligations. But this notion is completely in error. The notion arises from the fact that the member banks in the Federal Reserve System have been required to make a small investment in the System, totaling less than \$400 million, in what has been incorrectly called stock. This stock in no sense represents ownership, or a share of ownership, in the System or the Federal Reserve banks. The statute of 1913 which set up the Federal Reserve System makes this clear. Under this statute the so-called stock cannot be sold, it cannot be voted, it cannot be hypothecated or pledged to secure a loan, and it cannot share in the profits of the System, except for a fixed 6-percent-interest payment on the investment. And finally, the statute makes clear that if and when the System is terminated, all of the assets of the System will go into the Treasury, exclusive of an amount necessary to pay the stipulated 6-percent interest per annum on the so-called stock.

Over the years I have questioned many officials of the Federal Reserve System—including the present Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and the past Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Mr. Marriner Eccles—and all have testified to the effect that the Federal Reserve banks are owned by the Federal

Government—general public—not by the private commercial banks—see samples of testimony attached.

In summary, Mr. Speaker, the present method of counting as part of the outstanding public debt those debt obligations which have been paid for by the Government, and are thus owned by the general public, is bad and misleading. It will cause difficulties, because the amount of such obligations owned by the Government itself will necessarily grow, giving the public an impression that the public debt which is outstanding is growing a great deal faster than it actually is growing. We owe the public a proper accounting of the public debt, and if we give the public a proper accounting of the public debt, it will not now be necessary to increase the debt ceiling and thus disturb the minds of a great many people who are properly concerned about the public debt.

QUOTATIONS FROM TESTIMONY ON OWNERSHIP OF FEDERAL RESERVE ASSETS

Mr. PATMAN. Now these 6,500 banks, they have paid in 3 percent of their capital and surplus to the Federal Reserve Bank.

Mr. MARTIN. That is right. * * * Now it is it not, and I am glad it is not, proprietary interest on the part of the banks. (Wm. McC. Martin, Jr., chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the House Select Committee on Small Business, Nov. 21, 1957, p. 338.)

Mr. MARTIN. The banks through their stock ownership, which you have rightly pointed out a number of times, is not proprietorship, is not ownership. (Chairman Martin before the House Banking and Currency Committee, July 31, 1957, p. 377.)

Mr. PATMAN. Do you agree with Mr. Martin that the member banks do not own the Federal Reserve banks, and have no claim to their assets or income other than the interest payment on the so-called stock which the member banks are required to subscribe to the Federal Reserve banks?

Mr. SZYMCAK. That is correct. (M. S. Szymczak, member, Board of Governors, before the House Select Committee on Small Business, Apr. 16, 1958, p. 416.)

Mr. MILLS. Not a proprietary interest in the sense that the ownership or the representation of stock ownership in the Federal Reserve Banks entitles the member banks to the type of ownership and control of resources that is associated with stock ownership in private enterprise. (Abbot L. Mills, Jr., member, Board of Governors, before the House Select Committee on Small Business, Apr. 17, 1958, p. 448.)

Mr. ROBERTSON. The commercial banks hold stock in the Federal Reserve banks, but all that represents, as far as I can see, is membership in the Federal Reserve system * * *. They have no proprietary interest in the Federal System as such. (J. L. Robertson, member, Board of Governors, before the House Select Committee on Small Business, Apr. 17, 1958, p. 466.)

Mr. SHEPARDSON. I think we have never contended that the central bank, the Federal Reserve System, is owned by the commercial banks. On the contrary, we have taken every occasion in my knowledge to disabuse that idea. (Charles N. Shepardson, member, Board of Governors, before the House Select Committee on Small Business, Apr. 17, 1958, p. 480.)

THE UNITED STATES DID NOT HAVE A ROLE IN THE SOUTH VIETNAM COUP

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentle-

man from Delaware [Mr. McDowell] is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. McDOWELL. Mr. Speaker, having just returned from South Vietnam, as a member of the special study group of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, I can say with a certainty that the United States did not have a role in the bloody South Vietnam coup.

The fact of the matter is that both President Diem and his powerful brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu knew that a coup was in the making, and, furthermore, they knew that they could take steps to improve their government and thereby abort the coup by cutting the ground out from under the leaders of the coup which was being prepared. They did not take such steps, even though the United States took every step and every means possible to encourage them to do so.

As Joseph Alsop points out in the Washington Post of November 6:

Until the very eve of the coup, moreover, Ambassador Lodge continued his fruitless effort to persuade President Diem to set his house in order. His last attempt was made on Sunday, October 27, when Diem invited Lodge to join him on a visit of inspection in the countryside.

These are sad and horrible days for this little country, on which the hopes of so much of the free world rest for turning back the tide of communism in Asia.

We must ask ourselves, as Roscoe Drummond does in his column today:

Why are we doing all this—putting lives and treasure and troops into such a distant battle? We are doing it because the safety of all southeast Asia is at stake on this front of the anti-Communist struggle. Laos and Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma would be next.

South Vietnam is the crucial place to turn back the Communist aggression-by-guerrilla-warfare. The evidence is mounting that it can be done.

I think we must give the new government of Vietnam the same kind of powerful military support which we gave the Diem-Nhu government it has replaced. If we falter and are irresolute now we will undoubtedly sacrifice the keystone of the whole free world in Asia, and the cost of stopping the Communist aggression will escalate and skyrocket incalculably. I commend the columns by Joseph Alsop and Roscoe Drummond to my colleagues and to my countrymen, and include them here:

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 6, 1963]
TURNOVER IN SAIGON: NEW TEAM PROMISING START

(By Roscoe Drummond)

The rapidly moving events in Saigon—revolt, and new government replacing Diem in a span of 36 hours—are now sufficiently clear to begin to answer the questions which must deeply concern most Americans and many others.

Did the U.S. Government plot and procure the overthrow of the Diem regime?

How will it affect the anti-Communist war?

Why is the United States putting lives, treasure (\$1.5 million a day), and troops (nearly 15,000 military advisers and technicians) into this distant and bitter battle?

The Communist press in Moscow and North Vietnam (where the Communist Vietnamese are in control) find it convenient to answer the first question both ways. For

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several weeks they have been berating the United States for supporting the repressive Diem government and now berate the United States for bringing about its downfall.

The candid and factual answer is this: Neither the CIA nor the Embassy in Saigon nor any American official planned or plotted the coup. It could not have been seriously begun nor successfully completed unless the circumstances within South Vietnam had been ripe for revolt.

American policy unquestionably gave encouragement and incentive to the revolt.

The Kennedy administration welcomes the outcome in the conviction that the repressive policies of the Diem regime had lost it the loyalty of many Vietnamese people, and that it was thereby dissipating the vast American aid in its war against the Communist guerrillas.

President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and influential Members of Congress made it evident that military assistance could not continue indefinitely under these circumstances. Some reduction in aid was beginning to be carried out.

This confronted the South Vietnamese military leaders, who unitedly joined in the anti-Diem revolt, with a point-of-no-return decision. They either had to accept the continuance of the Diem-Nhu regime with all its autocratic shortcomings or see the war lost to the Communists for lack of American assistance.

The decision which Gen. Duong Van Minh and his associates made was that the fate of their nation depended upon freeing it from the divisive Diem-Nhu regime.

What next? Obviously no one can be sure. Government by military junta can go in any direction. But the beginnings are encouraging. It has elevated Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho, a figurehead under Diem. It has freed the Buddhist monks and other anti-Communist critics of Diem. It has lifted the censorship and has promised elections.

Undoubtedly the new government will step up the battle against the Vietcong. The generals in the revolt are not neutralists. They have no intention of negotiating away the independence of their country in some amorphous deal with the North Vietnamese Communists. They have the will to win.

There are two reasons why they will now have more means of winning. First, the United States will have the incentive to lend the maximum aid because it will be effectively used. Secondly, many security forces, which could have been deployed to the fighting areas, were hoarded by Diem for his own protection. They will now be available against the Communists.

Why are we doing all this—putting lives and treasure and troops into such a distant battle? We are doing it because the safety of all southeast Asia is at stake on this front of the anti-Communist struggle. Laos and Cambodia, Thailand and Burma would be next.

South Vietnam is the crucial place to turn back the Communist aggression by guerrilla warfare. The evidence is mounting that it can be done.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 6, 1963]

MATTER OF FACT: BLOOD ON OUR HANDS?

(By Joseph Alsop)

The American role in the bloodstained but purgative coup in South Vietnam is a subject demanding serious inquiry, if only because so much bosh is sure to be talked about it unless the facts are understood.

Beginning, then, at the beginning, the American Government was of course aware that the leaders of the Vietnamese Army were talking with one another about ways and means of displacing President Ngo Dinh Diem. Indeed, there was no way to avoid being aware of this.

As long as 2 months ago, when this reporter was in Saigon, he was taken into the confidence of one of the most active organizers of the coup. This member of the future junta listed the other generals who had already placed themselves under the leadership of Gen. Duong Van Minh; he said the coup would come soon; and he actually asked that the information be transmitted at once to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.

Long before the coup occurred, therefore, it was quite clear there was trouble ahead. The expectation of early trouble in fact led Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to send his personal plane to Saigon, so that Ambassador Lodge could make his planned visit to Washington without the extra days away from his post required for travel by the commercial airlines.

That simple fact in turn reveals another aspect of the story. While aware that trouble was brewing, the U.S. Government was in no sense a party to the preparations for the coup. Otherwise, the plan would never have been made for this Lodge trip to Washington, which was so abruptly forestalled when the coup took place.

Until the very eve of the coup, moreover, Ambassador Lodge continued his fruitless effort to persuade President Diem to set his house in order. His last attempt was made on Sunday, October 27, when Diem invited Lodge to join him on a visit of inspection in the countryside.

The long day with Diem gave the Ambassador the opportunity to discuss both the state of affairs in Vietnam, and its effects on United States-Vietnamese relations, in detail and at great length. He offered a list of modest but significant steps which Diem could take to relax the tension in Saigon, and to improve the climate in Washington. Every item on the Lodge list was categorically vetoed by Diem.

Lodge then asked Diem whether he had any suggestions of his own about possible means of escape from the impasse. Diem merely gave the Ambassador "a blank look and changed the subject," as Lodge subsequently reported. Yet on Monday Lodge returned to the attack with Diem's intelligent and flexible minister of defense, Nguyen Dinh Thuan.

Thuan, who described the program pressed by Lodge on Diem as "extremely moderate," promised to go to Diem and see whether his persuasions would have any effect. His first report was decidedly encouraging. But the second report from Thuan, the next day, was a gloomy, final negative. Diem's brother, the all-powerful and half-mad Ngo Dinh Nhu, had had his say in the interval.

In short, there was no way to save Diem and Nhu from themselves. Or rather, there was only one way. It was indicated to Secretary McNamara just before he left Vietnam by the able Englishman, Prof. Patrick Honey, who is the unusual expert on Vietnam without a personal ax to grind.

"You must understand," Honey told McNamara, "that the Diem regime will surely be destroyed by a coup unless the U.S. Government makes a ringing reassertion of confidence in Diem and support for his government as soon as you get back to Washington."

McNamara gave Honey's judgment to President Kennedy as his own judgment. But no reassertion of confidence in the Diem regime was possible, simply because the U.S. Government had quite rightly lost confidence in the Diem regime.

Such are the facts. They constitute an interesting moral problem. On the one hand, the U.S. Government had foreknowledge that a coup was being considered. In addition, the U.S. Government could have forestalled the coup—by stultifying itself. But the U.S. Government refused to stultify itself. Diem refused to put his house in order. And so the coup took place.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. BATES (at the request of Mr. PRICE), on account of official business.

Mr. PIRNIE (at the request of Mr. HALLECK), for today, and for the balance of the week, on account of official business as a member of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. HOLIFIELD (at the request of Mr. PRICE), on account of official business.

Mr. HOSMER (at the request of Mr. PRICE), on account of official business.

Mr. ANDERSON (at the request of Mr. PRICE), on account of official business.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina, for November 6, 1963, through November 15, 1963, on account of being a delegate to the NATO Parliamentarians Conference.

Mr. HARDY (at the request of Mr. ALBERT), for today, November 6, 1963, on account of death in the family.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

Mr. WILSON of Indiana, for 15 minutes, on Tuesday next.

Mr. WILSON of Indiana, for 15 minutes, on Wednesday next.

Mr. LAIRD for 20 minutes, today, and to revise and extend his remarks.

Mr. UTT, for 45 minutes, on November 7.

Mr. PATMAN, for 30 minutes, today, to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. SCHADEBERG (at the request of Mr. REIFEL), for 60 minutes, on Thursday, November 7, 1963.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to extend remarks in the Appendix of the Record, or to revise and extend remarks, was granted to:

Mrs. KELLY and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. HUDDLESTON in five instances and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. ZABLOCKI in two instances and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. GROSS in two instances and to include extraneous material.

Mr. FINO.

Mr. MCINTIRE and to include extraneous matter, notwithstanding the fact it exceeds the limit and is estimated by the Public Printer to cost \$225.

Mr. WICKERSHAM and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. ROBERTS of Alabama and to include extraneous matter following the vote on the District bill today.

Mr. FRASER and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. STAEBLER.

Mr. MORSE (at the request of Mr. REIFEL) during debate on conference report on H.R. 6143.

Mr. BOLAND (at the request of Mr. BOGGS) during debate on conference report on H.R. 6143 and to include extraneous matter.